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This paper separates market power and efficiency effects of concentration in a sample of 255 U.S. 
manufacturing industries and computes welfare changes from rises in concentration. The empirical 
findings reveal that in nearly two-third of the cases, consumers lose as efficiency gains are generally 
pocketed by the industries. From an aggregate welfare standpoint, concentration is found to be beneficial 
in nearly 70% of the cases, mostly for low and moderate levels of concentration being particularly 
against the public interest in highly concentrated markets. Overall, the results support the existing U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission guidelines for approval of mergers.    
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Traditionally, the existence of excessive price-cost 
margins has justified antitrust action without regard to 
the level of prices and costs separately. With ongoing 
dramatic increases in industrial concentration and 
globalization of markets, this conventional wisdom has 
been challenged more recently (Blair and Harrison, 
1999; Berger and Hannan, 1998).  However, 
concentration changes induce both price and cost 
changes. While price variations raise questions regarding 
consumer welfare, cost variations do the same regarding 
technical efficiency. 
In the last two decades the U.S. manufacturing 
sector has experienced dramatic changes in market 
concentration. Most manufacturing industries have 
experienced rises in market concentration, particularly 
those classified as “highly concentrated” by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (1992).  Although many studies have found 
that market concentration affects both prices and 
production cost (e.g., Allen, 1983; Chappell and Cottle, 
1985 and Martin, 1988), none of these studies 
established a structural link between costs and 
concentration (Berger, 1995). Furthermore, beyond the 
empirical measures and testing of the market power 
effects of concentration, studies covering the welfare 
effects of market power and efficiency effects for a wide 
range of industries are lacking. 
 The thrust of this study is to investigate under what 
circumstances market concentration leads to social 
welfare enhancement. The welfare calculations include 
both oligopoly power and efficiency effects. The 
underlying econometric model is a variation of the 
oligopsony study by Azzam (1997). The empirical 
findings indicate that concentration is more likely to be 
beneficial when the degree of concentration is low and 
the price elasticity of demand high. For highly 
concentrated industries (Herfindahl index greater than 
1800), any benefits of efficiency gains are generally 
outweighed by market power increases. These findings 
support the current Department of Justice guidelines for 
scrutinizing merger activity in highly concentrated 
industries.  Further results show that consumers 
generally lose with concentration as efficiency gains are 
generally pocketed by the industries. 
 
2. Empirical Model 
 
The econometric model draws on the work of Clarke 
and Davis (1982) and Azzam (1997). Consider an 
oligopolistic industry with a market demand function  
Q=ƒ(P,z) and  n number of firms producing a 
homogenous product. Q is the total industry output, P is 
the output price and z is a vector of demand shifters. 
 Each firm is assumed to choose its output level in 
order to maximize profits: 
 
  ) , , ( ) , ( t w q C q z Q P i i i i - = P ,  (1) 
 
where qi = firm i’s output,  
 
Q ( ; ￿ =
i
i q  i=1,…n). 
 
The firm’s dual cost function is represented by Ci(qi,w,t)   
in which w is a non-negative vector of exogenous input 
prices and t represents the state of technology.  
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Q h  is the price elasticity of 
demand,  
  mci = the firm’s marginal cost. 
 
The cost function is assumed to take the restricted 
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Summing (3) across firms in the industry, using the 
market shares as weights the derived input demand 
functions and the supply relation for a particular industry 
can be obtained: When is Concentration Beneficial?  Lirón-España and Lopez 
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where   Xj = the total industry employment of the  j
th 
input,  




2  = the Herfindahl Index,  
  a is the weighted conjectural variation,  
  ç is the price elasticity of demand.  
 
Let the weighted marginal cost (the numerator of (5)) be 
expressed by mc= â0 +2QH â1. 
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0 =  the 
intercept, 
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j
j jw b b1 = its slope in quantity space.  
Thus, b1 equals zero, a negative or a positive value for 
constant, increasing and decreasing economies of size, 
respectively 
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where   d is a price deflator,  
  y stands for the U.S. national income, and  
  t captures changes in taste and preference. 
 
Market equilibrium in a particular industry is 
reached when P and Q fulfill equations for the supply 
relation and demand function simultaneously. 
Consequently, the elasticity of price with respect to the 
Herfindahl index ( åP,H) is obtained by applying the 
implicit-function theorem to equations (5) and (6): 
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where  åP,H is the elasticity of price with respect to the 
Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the market-power 
elasticity åL,H and the efficiency elasticity åc,H, multiplied 
by the price-quantity adjustment  ë.. While the market 
power elasticity is always positive, the sign of the 
efficiency elasticity and the strength of the price-quantity 
adjustment will depend on the sign of â1. For instance, if 
â1<0, the efficiency elasticity is negative and the price-
quantity adjustment is greater than 1.  
Next consider the impacts of concentration on 
welfare. A rise in concentration will lead to price, 
quantity and cost variations. The former two affect both 
consumer and producer surpluses and the latter affects 
only producer surplus. The changes in consumer surplus 
(dCS), producer surplus ( dPS), and net social welfare 
(dSW) from an increase in concentration from H0 to H1 
are given by: 
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dPS dCS dSW + = ,  (10) 
 
where  (P0Q0) and  (P1Q1) are the equilibrium prices and 
quantities, given H0 and H1, respectively.  
As an illustration, consider the equilibrium depicted 
in Figure 1 representing the case of a rise in 
concentration from H0 to H1 with economies of size and 
a net price decline. The change in consumer surplus is 
(A+B), where A is a pure transfer and B is a deadweight 
loss. The change in producer surplus is given by 
(C+D+E-A). In this particular example, there is an 
increase in social welfare given by (B+C+D+E) where 
both consumers and producers are winners. 
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3. Empirical Implementation 
 
A model consisting of five structural equations is 
estimated. The sample consists of annual data for the 
period 1972-1992 for 255 U.S. manufacturing industries 
at the four-digit SIC level. The inputs are divided into 
three categories: capital (K), labor (L) and material (M). 
The full model of industry equilibrium consists of a set 
of three derived input demand equations a pricing 
equation and a market demand equation.  The 
endogenous variables are Q,,P, XK , XL , and XM . The 
exogenous variables consist of WK ,WL ,WM , y,d, and H.. 
The non-linear 3SLS estimation procedure was 
implemented using the SHAZAM 7.0 software. The 
equilibrium P and Q before and after a 1% increase in 
the Herfindahl index (at mean values) are determined 
simultaneously by solving equations (5) and (6) with the 
MATLAB 4.0 software. The same software was used to 
compute the ensuing welfare changes for each of the 255 
U.S. manufacturing industries.  
The main data sources for prices and quantities of 
outputs and inputs was the online National Bureau of 
Economic Research database of Bartelsman and Gray 
(1996) on U.S. manufacturing industries. Due to lack of 
data on the price of capital at the 4-digit SIC level, all 
industries are assumed to face the same rental prices but 
each to have a different level of capital stock. Therefore, 
the rental price of capital was computed by dividing the 
cost of capital services (provided electronically by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics) divided by total capital assets 
at the 2-digit SIC level.  Also due to data limitations, we 
use maximum entropy with market shares derived from 
concentration ratios (Golan, Judge, and Perloff, 1996) 
and extrapolate an instrumental variable for the 
Herfindahl index.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 shows the number of the industries in the 
sample (255 in total) that experienced net welfare 
increases and decreases after a one-percent rise in the 
Herfindahl index. Following the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (1992) guidelines, the industries were 
classified into three categories: low (H < 1000), medium 
(1000£ H<1800), and high (1800  £ H £ 10,000 upper 
limit) concentration levels.  
The results summarized in Table 1 indicate that 
increases in concentration lead to increases in social 
welfare in approximately 69.4% (177 out of 255) of the 
industries analyzed. Note however, that 81% of these 
industries (143) are in the low concentration category, 
which is, of course, in part due to the fact that 
approximately 77% of the industries are classified as low 
concentration.  Nonetheless, concentration would be 
socially beneficial in approximately 72.6% (143 out of 
197) of the low-concentration industries.  For the 
moderate-concentration industries, increases in 
concentration lead to social welfare improvement in 
approximately two-thirds of the cases (30 out of 45). On 
the other hand, only 31% of the highly concentrated 
industries show an i mprovement in social welfare as 
these industries further concentrate. These results lend 
support to the guidelines used by the Federal Trade 
Commission that closely scrutinizes mergers of highly 
concentrated industries but generally allows mergers in 
low-concentration industries.  
From the aggregate welfare changes it seems that 
concentration is mostly desirable in low and moderately 
concentrated industries. An important issue is how 
concentration affects consumers; that is, whether any 
efficiency gains are passed on to the consumers or are 
simply pocketed by the oligopolistic industries. In nearly 
64% of the cases (163 out of 255), concentration leads to 
consumer losses; that is, it leads to price declines in only 
approximately 36% (92) of the cases.  In the 163 
industries where consumers lose, concentration leads to 
significant efficiency gains that outweigh the consumer 
losses in 85 additional industries leading to a total of 177 
(85+92) where concentration is beneficial from an 
aggregate welfare standpoint. 
To obtain further insight into the pattern of 
concentration impacts on social, we estimated the 
following regression model: 
 
  v DS HD HD H dSW + + + + + + = 5 4 2 3 1 2 1 0 g h g g g g g ,  (11) 
 
where   dSW is the social welfare change;  
  H is the Herfindahl index at mean values for 
each industry;  
  HD1 and HD2 are dummy variables that take the 
value of 1 for moderate- and highly-concentrated 
industries,  
  h is the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
demand,  
  DS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for significant economies of size (below 0.7),  
  v is an error term, and the ã's are parameters to 
be estimated. The results are presented in Table 2. 
These regression results strengthen the previous 
conclusions with respect to the impact of concentration 
on social welfare. Concentration is beneficial for low 
levels of concentration, still beneficial for moderate When is Concentration Beneficial?  Lirón-España and Lopez 
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levels (ã1+ã2=4.963), and detrimental in highly 
concentrated industries (ã1+ã3=-3.912). Note, however, 
that the coefficients for the Herfindahl index and the 
slope shifter for the highly concentrated industries are 
significant at the 1% level and that the one for the 
moderate concentration is significant only at the 10% 
level.  
Note also that the elasticity of demand plays an 
important role in determining the impact of 
concentration on social welfare. The more elastic the 
demand for the output, the more likely concentration 
will have a beneficial impact on social welfare. This is 
consistent with the fact that a more elastic demand 
restricts market power and mitigates the impact of 
oligopolistic quantity restrictions on price. Finally, the 
economies of size dummy failed to show a discernible 
effect in shaping the impact of concentration on social 
welfare. This may not be surprising since the Herfindahl 





A key motivation of this paper is that ongoing 
changes in concentration have to be evaluated not only 
for their effects on market power, which are generally 
detrimental to consumers and result in deadweight 
losses, but also in light of efficiency effects that may 
actually lead to beneficial aggregate welfare changes and 
even lower consumer prices.  
This paper examines social welfare effects of rises in 
concentration for 255 U.S. manufacturing industries 
taking into account both market power  and efficiency 
effects. Concentration is mostly beneficial for industries 
in low- and moderately- concentrated markets but is 
detrimental in highly concentrated markets, even if 
efficiencies are strong. Overall, concentration is found to 
be socially beneficial (from an aggregate welfare 
standpoint) in nearly 71% of the cases.  
The distributional consequences are quite stark: in 
nearly two-thirds of the cases, consumers lose, arising 
from the fact that efficiency gains are mostly pocketed 
by the oligopolistic industries. Finally, the results 
generally support the current merger guidelines of the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission in which industries with 
high levels of concentration are scrutinized not only for 
their impact on net social welfare but also on consumer 
welfare. In sum, although concentration generally 
increases aggregate welfare, it generally benefits 
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Table 1: Welfare Changes from a Rise in Concentration, U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1972-1992. 
 








Social Welfare:         




143 (72.6%)  32 (66.7%)  2 (20%)  177 (69.4%) 
 
Total   197  48  10  255 
 
Consumer Welfare: 
     




75 (38.1%)  15 (31.2%)  2 (20%)  92 (36.07%) 
 
Total   197  48  10  255 
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Table 2:  Regression Results Explaining Social Welfare Changes 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic 
H 
1 g   13.233***  2.594 
HD1  2 g   -8.270*  -1.93 
HD2  3 g   -17.145***  -3.43 
h   4 g   1.420***  4.120 
DS 
5 g   3.025  1.210 
Constant 
0 g   0.89863***  4.092 
Notes: The levels 10%, 5% and 1% of significance are represented by *, ** and ***, respectively.  The dependent 
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